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Risk Aversion in Rural India
Abstract
How does one measure financial risk aversion for a rural individual that has no
knowledge of financial products? What household variables influence financial risk aversion? To answer this
question, this study implemented Biswanger’s Lottery with an added gains and losses competent, in a series of
six games, on a sample of 45 individuals drawn from two villages in rural India. For each participant,
information on net wealth, net income, occupation and gender
was recorded.
The overall distribution of risk class was primarily intermediate risk aversion, followed by severe and moderate
risk aversion. While the effect of gender was significant, its relationship with risk aversion was nonlinear.
Similarly, the paradoxical behavior of the landless laborer was highlighted and discussed.
Keywords
financial risk aversion, rural India
Disciplines
Business
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/sire/10
  
  
Social Impact Research Experience Summer 2011 
Risk Aversion in 
Rural India 
 
Page | 1  
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Katherine Milkman for the Operations and Information 
Management Department for her guidance; Dr. Martin Asher, Program Director of the Research 
and Scholars program, for his guidance and support; Bethany Schell and the rest of the SIRE 
support team; the SIRE program for its kind support.   
I would also like to thank Bindu Ananth, Shilpa Sathe and Amit Shah from the IFMR 
Trust (Chennai, India) for their mentorship and guidance from structuring the study to 
identifying potential sample villages in Thanjavur; Shreyes Upadhyay, for allowing me to adapt 
his survey for measuring a rural household’s net assets and net income; my translator 
Jaychandran Earnest; Mani Rajan and family for hosting me at his lovely home in Panaiyur and 
guiding me around both villages, and the 45 individuals from the villages of Panaiyur and 
Pawanmangalam that participated in this study.  
 
  
Page | 2  
 
 
Table of Contents 
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 3 
Literature Review............................................................................................................................ 4 
Theory ......................................................................................................................................... 4 
Measurements of Risk Aversion ................................................................................................. 6 
Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 11 
Sample Statistics ........................................................................................................................... 14 
Results ........................................................................................................................................... 16 
Testing the Scale Effect............................................................................................................. 17 
Loss Aversion ............................................................................................................................ 18 
Relationship with Household Variables........................................................................................ 19 
Net Assets .................................................................................................................................. 19 
Net Income ................................................................................................................................ 20 
Occupation ................................................................................................................................ 21 
Gender ....................................................................................................................................... 22 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 23 
Works Cited .................................................................................................................................. 24 
Appendix: I) Household Survey ................................................................................................... 26 
Appendix: II) Game Results ......................................................................................................... 38 
 
  
Page | 3  
 
Overview 
How does one measure financial risk aversion for a rural individual that has no 
knowledge of financial products? What household variables influence financial risk aversion? To 
answer this question, this study implemented Biswanger’s Lottery with an added gains and losses 
competent, in a series of six games, on a sample of 45 individuals drawn from two villages in 
rural India. For each participant, information on net wealth, net income, occupation and gender 
was recorded. 
The overall distribution of risk class was primarily intermediate risk aversion, followed 
by severe and moderate risk aversion. While the effect of gender was significant, its relationship 
with risk aversion was nonlinear. Similarly, the paradoxical behavior of the landless laborer was 
highlighted and discussed.  
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Literature Review  
Theory 
The Expected Utility Approach (Arrow Pratt Functions), an “important advance in the 
economics of uncertainty” determines relationships between risk aversion and wealth. (Menezes 
and Hanson,1970). Absolute Risk Aversion  = −		”		 measures risk aversion when 
wealth is varied, but risk is fixed. Although individuals can have increasing, decreasing or 
constant absolute risk aversion, Arrow has hypothesized decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA), i.e.an individual is less risk averse as his or her wealth increases.  Relative risk 
aversion 	 = 	− ∗ 	”		describes risk aversion when an individual’s wealth and the 
prospect are changed by the same proportion. Arrow formulated that individuals have 
increasingly relative risk aversion (IRRA), or that individuals are more risk averse when wealth 
and risky prospects are increased by the same proportion. Partial relative risk aversion 
determines risk aversion when wealth is fixed, but the risky prospect presented varies, and is 
denoted as 	, = − ∗ 	"		  where m is defined as the size of the payoffs. Arrow 
formulates increasing partial risk aversion, or that individuals are more risk averse as the scale of 
the prospect increases when wealth is kept constant.  
While Expected Utility assumes that Risk Aversion is primarily a function of an 
individual’s wealth, Prospect Theory, developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1979), asserts that 
an individual’s risk appetite is determined by how a prospect is presented. An implication of 
Propect Theory is Loss Aversion, or that an individual is risk seeking for gains, and risk averse 
for losses. This is contrary to the Expected Utility framework that assumes individuals will react 
similarly to prospects that provide the same expected outcome, regardless of whether it is 
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expressed as a gain or loss. Kahenmen and Tversky termed this effect as the reflection effect, and 
showed that preferences can be mirrored depending on whether they are presented in terms of 
purely gains, or as a gain or loss. 
Kahenmen and Tversky (1979) reject asset integration, which postulates that an 
individual’s risk aversion is a function of his or her final wealth. Prospect Theory postulates the 
isolation effect, which states that individuals evaluate risky prospects without evaluating the 
impact on final wealth levels. Thus, while the Expected Utility theorem states that total overall 
wealth, or the final state of wealth, determines risk aversion, the isolation effect states that 
changes in wealth are more important to determine risk aversion. This implies that proxies for 
final wealth level, such as net assets or net income, may not be predictors for risk aversion. 
Biswanger (1980) and Rabin (2000) reject asset integration as well.   
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Measurements of Risk Aversion  
The first non-interviewer attempt to measure risk aversion in a developing world context 
was Hans Biswanger’s lottery approach (1980), implemented in rural India (and henceforth 
referred to as the Biswanger Lottery.) The lottery is as follows: Respondents were given a set of 
games, marked from O to F, as show below in Table 1. Each game had two payoffs: Tails 
represented a higher payoff, while the amount under heads represents a lower payoff. Farmers 
had to choose a game from O to F, and a coin was flipped to determine the outcome and a real 
payoff was made accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Elaboration of Biswanger’s Lottery 
Game Heads Tails Expected Outcome 
Standard 
Deviation Z=△E/△SD Risk class 
Approximate 
Partial Risk 
Aversion Coefficient 
O 50 50 50 0 1to 0.80 Extreme ∞ to 7.51 
A 45 95 70 35 .8 to .66 Severe 7.51to 1.74 
B 40 120 80 57 .66 to .5 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81 
D* 35 125 80 64  Inefficient  
C 30 150 90 85 .5 to .33 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32 
D 20 160 90 99  Inefficient  
E 10 190 100 127 .33 to 0 Slight to Neutral 0.32 to 0 
F 0 200 100 141 0 to - Negative to Neutral 0 to -∞ 
 
For each successive game (from O to F) as the expected value increased, so did the 
standard deviation. Table 2, shown above, illustrates the relationship between the expected 
Table  1: Biswanger’s Lottery 
Game 
Number Heads Tails 
O 50 50 
A 45 95 
B 40 120 
 D* 35 125 
C 30 150 
D 20 160 
E 10 190 
F 0 200 
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outcome, standard deviation and the partial risk aversion coefficient, which in turn determined 
the risk class of an individual.  
The six risk classes Biswanger adopted (in descending order of risk aversion) were: 
Extreme, Severe, Intermediate, Moderate, Slight to Neutral, and Neutral to Risk Seeking. As 
seen above, choices D and D* represented inefficient options, i.e., options which had the same 
expected outcome as B and C respectively, but a larger standard deviation. For the purposes of 
classification, individuals that selected option D and D* were grouped into into the risk classes 
of option B and C respectively (ie, intermediate and moderate respectively). 
The Rs. 50 game was replicated at the following scales: 1/100, 1/10 and 10 (equivalent of 
Rs. 0.50, Rs. 5 and Rs. 500 game levels). This tested for increasing partial risk aversion, or 
whether increasing or decreasing the scale of payoffs would alter an individual’s risk class.  
Furthermore, the lottery made both real payoffs as well as presented hypothetical situations. 
Although participants were more risk averse in real payoffs, this difference was not statistically 
significant.  
Overall, the sample had a moderate risk aversion. Assets, measured as gross sale value of 
physical assets, had a negative relation with risk aversion, which was significant at the Rs. 0.5 
and Rs. 5 level, but not at the Rs. 50 and Rs. 500 level. Its impact on risk aversion is not 
massive- at a Rs. 5 level, the shift of wealth from the average level to the largest level would 
imply a shift from moderate risk aversion to risk neutrality. However, at the Rs. 50 level and Rs. 
500 level, or games that involved amounts that are “commensurate with monthly wage levels or 
small agricultural investments”, wealth has “little impact” on risk aversion. The author suggested 
the use of net worth of assets as a better measure of wealth.  
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Women were more risk averse than men, although this was not statistically significant. 
Biswanger believed there was little evidence to support the hypothesis that women were less risk 
averse than men, however, he said this may have been confounded since none of the women in 
the sample had ever attended school. Age was positively correlated with Risk Aversion for the 
Rs. 0.5 and Rs. 5 level, but negatively correlated at the Rs. 50 and Rs. 500 level 
Bruntup (2000) implemented the Biswanger lottery in 75 households in Benin. In this 
study, a farmer was given gift money and the choice to stay on and play in the lottery, or leave. 
The lottery was played thrice: first, at a 50 FCFA level with real payoffs, at the 500 FCFA level 
with real payoffs, and lastly hypothetical game at the 5000 FCFA level. Farmers gambled 
separately to ensure that they were not influenced through the “luck” factor. Bruntup noted that 
payoffs were structured to be comparable with real income decisions – for example 500 FCFA is 
indicative of several days of cash income for a farmer. Although Bruntup observed an overall 
level of severe risk aversion, he noted that in “real economic decisions with a higher time 
horizon” such as decisions to make expensive agricultural investments such as mineral fertilizers 
or farming equipment, expected risk aversion would be higher.  
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2007) ran the lottery on a sample of 262 individuals chosen 
randomly from 12 villages from rural Ethiopia. The lottery was framed in the following manner: 
farmers were told that to assume six different farming systems, each costing the same, but the 
outcomes would vary depending on whether there is a good harvest or a bad harvest. 
THouseholds had one of the following six outcomes: A coin was flipped to reveal whether there 
was a good harvest or a bad harvest, and real payoffs were made according. This experiment was 
split into two sections. The first part was designed as a “gains only” game., and was played 
consecutively in 5 different scales in ‘5 sets’ – initially at at Birr 0.5 level, and scaled up to Birr 
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2.5, Birr 5, Birr 10, and Birr 15. The second part of the game comprised of the same games 
expressed in terms of gains and losses. Only farmers that made enough in the first part could 
participate in the second portion. Set 5 of the game (at Birr 15) was played at a hypothetical level 
to ensure that there were no major losses. An example of the payoff structure at the 0.5 level is 
shown below 
Table 3: Gains only and Gains and Losses game at 0.5 Level. 
Game  First Part: Gains Only 
Risk class 
Second Part: Gains and Losses 
Bad Harvest Good Harvest Bad Harvest Good Harvest 
1 0.5 0.5 Extreme 0 0 
2 0.45 0.95 Severe -0.05 0.45 
3 0.4 1.2 Intermediate -0.1 0.7 
4 0.3 1.5 Moderate -0.2 1 
5 0.2 1.6 Slight to Neutral -0.3 1.1 
6 0.1 1.9 Negative to Neutral -0.4 1.4 
 
The results are as follows: 50% of the farmers were classified under extreme to severe 
risk aversion categories. Farmers treated gains only and mixed games (gains and losses) 
differently; reproducing the same game in a mixed game form had a ‘statistically significant and 
empirically large effect,’ thus producing behavior that was more risk averse, reaffirming the 
prospect theory. Increasing partial risk aversion, or a trend of increasing risk as the scale of the 
prospect was increased with constant wealth, was observed. Decreasing absolute risk aversion 
was observed, which implied that that wealthy households were more willing to make risky 
investments for higher returns.  
Holt and Laury (2002) formulated a switch lottery, in which students were presented with 
a choice such as 1/10 of $2, 9/10 of $1.6 or 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10, and were successively 
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presented with ascending choices (2/10 of $2, 8/10 of $1.6 or 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10). The 
point at which an individual switched over from A to B is used to measure an individual’s risk 
aversion. This approach was not adapted due to the complexity of probabilities involved – the 
sample for Holt and Laury’s study were business students who had a knowledge of statistics, 
while the sample for this study are farmers who may not have a nuanced understanding of 
probability.    
 Hartog et al (2000), implements a direct approach, where individuals are asked to name 
the price he or she is willing to pay for a lottery ticket. This approach would not be feasible in 
developing countries for the several reasons- firstly, it would require an understanding of a 
lottery. Secondly, in regions where gambling is banned, this approach would be unfeasible. 
Thirdly, it is subject to an interviewer’s bias.  
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Methodology 
A series of 6 games was constructed, which was modeled off Biswanger’s lottery with an 
additional gains and losses component. The experiment was split into two phases – Game 1 to 
game 4 was administered on Day 1, and Game 5 and Game 6 was administered after a minimum 
gap of 4 days. The games and the underlying description are as follows: 
Game 1 
 
Game 2 
O 50 50 O 100 100 
A 45 95 A 90 190 
B 40 120 B 80 240 
C 30 150 C 60 300 
D 20 160 D 40 320 
E 10 190 E 20 380 
F 0 200 F 0 400 
 
Imagine that you had to place Rs. 50 (Rs. 100 for Game 2) in one of the following 7 options. If it 
is a good day (50% chance) you will receive the amount in the right column. If it is a bad day, 
(50% chance) you will receive the amount in the left column. Which game will you choose?   
Game 3 and Game 4 are the same as Game 1 and 2, but expressed in a gains and losses 
form. The payoff and accompanying instructions are as follows:  
Game 3 
 
Game 4 
O 0 0 O 0 0 
A -5 45 A -10 90 
B -10 70 B -20 140 
C -20 100 C -40 200 
D -30 110 D -60 220 
E -40 140 E -80 280 
 F -50 150 F -100 300 
 
Imagine that you had to make a choice from the following 7 options. If it’s a good day (50% 
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chance) you will receive the amount in the right column. If it’s a bad day (50% chance), you will 
received the amount in the left column. Which game will you choose?  
After a gap of minimum 4 days, Game 5 & Game 6 was administered. The payoffs, 
which are given below, are the same as game 1 & game 2. The addition of these two games 
would be tested to see whether preferences were stable over time, i.e., measure that the choices 
are consistent. 
Game 5 
 
Game 6 
O 50 50 O 100 100 
A 45 95 A 90 190 
B 40 120 B 80 240 
C 30 150 C 60 300 
D 20 160 D 40 320 
E 10 190 E 20 380 
F 0 200 F 0 400 
 
While playing the game, no effort will be made to isolate participants from their peers – 
such as family and close friends. This was done to mimic the setting in which real financial 
decisions are made in a rural setting – i.e., in a communal manner. Furthermore, the payoff 
structures will be left with the participants for the duration of the entire experiment to allow for 
long periods of consultation.  
No real payoffs are made – only hypothetical scenarios are presented. This is because the 
sample villages were in the state of Tamil Nadu in India, which has laws banning gambling- thus 
handing out real payoffs would be illegal. To mimic a real financial decision, the experiment was 
preceded by a rigorous questionnaire (attached in the appendix) that surveyed every household 
for accurate information on its assets, liabilities, income and liabilities. Although the collected 
household data was used for determining relationships with risk aversion, it was a primer for 
individuals to provide accurate information when answering each game.  
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Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 were chosen as the two scale points after looking at both the 
daily wage of an agricultural laborer (which was Rs. 80 to Rs. 130), as well as as the 
current array of micro insurance and micro investment products (money market mutual 
funds, gold coins).1 As this study aimed to understand risk aversion as applicable to 
personal finance decisions, such as the risk appetite for a micro insurance or micro 
investment products, larger amounts were not considered.  Extending the study to 
include larger amounts would reflect risk appetite for larger investment decisions, such 
as setting up a small business, or purchasing agricultural machinery. However, it would 
not reflect their response to current micro insurance and micro-investment products 
offered in the region.  
Table 4: Extension of Game 1 with risk classes and partial risk aversion coefficient  
Game Heads Tails Expected Outcome 
Standard 
Deviation Z=△E/△SD Risk class 
Approximate 
Partial Risk 
Aversion Coefficient 
O 50 50 50 0 1to 0.80 Extreme ∞ to 7.51 
A 45 95 70 35 .8 to .66 Severe 7.51to 1.74 
B 40 120 80 57 .66 to .5 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81 
C 30 150 90 85 .5 to .33 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32 
D 20 160 90 99  Inefficient  
E 10 190 100 127 .33 to 0 Slight to Neutral 0.32 to 0 
F 0 200 100 141 0 to - Negative to Neutral 0 to -∞ 
 
Table 4 elaborates the game at the Rs. 50 level, aswell as corresponding risk 
classes. Game D is an inefficient factor in our game- it had the same expected return as 
Game C (which was a moderate risk class), but a larger standard deviation.  For the 
purpose of analysis, the results of Game D will be grouped with Game C, under 
moderate risk aversion, as done in Biswanger (1980), Bruntup (2000) and Yesuf and 
Bluffstone (2006).  
                                                 
1
 Refer to IFMR Rural Channals for an elaboration of products: http://ruralchannels.ifmr.co.in/the-kgfs-
way/products-array/product-chart/ 
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Restricting the game at the Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 limits testing the scale effect to a 
maximum of 2x. The results of testing for scale cannot be extended to understanding an 
individual’s behavior at higher levels.  
Sample Statistics 
A total of 45 individuals from 28 households were interviewed from 2 villages 
(37 individuals from Panaiyur and 11 from Pawanamangalam), in the district of 
Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu. India. From the 45 individuals interviewed, 17 (38%) were 
female.  
Occupation was reported as primary occupation of the household, as well as 
primary occupation of the individual. 64% of households reported their primarily 
occupation as agriculture (out of which, one third were landless), while 18% reported it 
as own business owners and another 18% as salaried workers. From an individual 
perspective, 39% reported his or her primary occupation as agriculture (landless 
comprising 11%), 29% as housewives, 17% owned a business, while 15% were 
salaried.  
Net Income was measured as total reported income minus total reported 
expenses. The average income Rs 105,570, with the median at Rs. 26,325 denoting the 
presence of outliers – the minimum net income was – 11,900, while the maximum net 
income was Rs. 884,000.  
Net Assets was calculated as Current Assets + Non-Current Assets – Liabilities. 
The survey used is attached in the appendix. The definitions of each are elaborated 
below   
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• Current Assets include Cash holdings, Savings in deposit account, Bullion and 
ornaments, Accounts receivable, Livestock, Inventory (Raw Material, Work in 
Progress, Finished Goods) 
• Non-Current Assets include Household, Agricultural assets, business assets as well 
as Land/other fixed asset 
• Liabilities are self-reported amounts owed to money lenders, institutions or other 
individuals  
The average reported net wealth was Rs. 1.89 million, and the median was Rs. 
640,000. There was great variance in the distribution with two peaks on the extremes, 
and a bell shaped distribution from Rs 200,000 and Rs. 1.2 million. While the largest 
proportion of households (35%) reported net asset between Rs. 0 -200,000 , 25% of 
households reported net assets greater than Rs. 1.6 million, while none reported net 
assets between Rs 1.2 million and 1.6 million.    
  
Page | 16  
 
Results    
 
Table 5: Results of the 6 games 
Risk Class Game Choice Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 
Extreme O 2 2 0 1 1 3 
Severe A 14 13 10 9 12 12 
Intermediate B 16 15 14 16 11 15 
Moderate C 7 7 11 7 10 8 
Inefficient D 1 4 3 7 4 3 
Slight to neutral E 3 3 4 1 4 3 
Negative to neutral F 2 1 3 4 3 1 
 
The results of the experiment are summarized in table 5 above. The 6 games are 
summarized in chart 1. Overall, the sample had intermediate risk aversion, with more 
than half the sample split between severe and moderate risk aversion (25.93% and 
26.67% of the sample respectively).  
The chi square was not significant for the Game 1&5 (Rs. 50 games which were 
not expressed in terms of gains and losses) as well as Game 2 & Game 6 (Rs. 100 
games which were not expressed in terms of gains and losses). This implies that the 
preferences captured by gains only games at the Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 level was stable. 
Severe, 25.93 Intermediate, 32.22 Moderate, 26.67 6.67 5.19
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Percentage of respondents 
Chart 1: Overall Distribution (N=270)
Extreme Severe Intermediate Moderate Slight to neutral Negative to neutral
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However, the low cell counts in the some of the cells, where 6 cells had less than 5 
counts, could pose a limitation to the accuracy of this test.  
Testing the Scale Effect 
Table 6: Testing the scale effect for Rs. 50 and Rs. 100 
 
 
 
 
 
The scale effect, or increasing partial risk aversion implies that a higher payoff, given the 
same wealth, would result in a choice that is more risk averse. Games played at a Rs. 50 level 
(Game 1, Game 3, and Game 5) were tested against the Rs. 100 games (Game 2, Game 4 and 
Game 6). The Chi square test failed to reject the Null hypothesis, which stated that there was no 
significant difference between the responses at the Rs. 50 and Rs. 100.  This does not reject 
increasing partial risk aversion in its entirety, as the increase in scale may not be significant 
enough to cause a change in risk aversion.  
The Scale effect was tested separately for games expressed in gains only, and gains and 
losses. It was not significant for gains only games (Game 1 and Game 5 at the Rs. 50 level, and 
Game 2 and Game 6 at the Rs. 100 level). It was not significant for gains and losses games 
(Game 3 at the Rs. 50 level, and Game 4 at the Rs. 100 level) at 0.05 level, but was significant at 
0.10 level. In both two tests, there were multiple cells which had a count less than 5 – and this 
was a limitation in interpreting the effectiveness of the chi-square test. 
  
Risk Class 
Count (N= 270) In Percentage 
Rs. 50  Rs. 100   Rs. 50   Rs. 100   
Extreme 3 6 2.22 4.44 
Severe 36 34 26.67 25.19 
Intermediate 41 46 30.37 34.07 
Moderate 28 22 20.74 16.30 
Inefficient 8 14 5.93 10.37 
Slight to neutral 11 7 8.15 5.19 
Negative to neutral 8 6 5.93 4.44 
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Loss Aversion  
To test loss aversion, the chi-square is tested on games expressed in gains and losses to games 
that are expressed as gains only – thus  
For the Rs. 50 game, loss aversion was significant at the 0.05 level. However, this 
statistic is not reliable as cell counts were less than 5 in 4 occasions. Chart 2, shows a shift 
towards more risk seeking classes in the gains and losses game as compared to the gains only 
game. However, one cannot determine whether this is statistically significant or not.  
 
 At the Rs. 100 game, loss aversion was significant at the 0.05 level. However, this 
statistic is not reliable as cell counts were less than 5 in 5 occasions.   
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Extreme
Severe
Intermediate
Moderate
Slight to neutral
Negative to neutral
Percentage of Respondents
Chart 2: Testing Loss Aversion at Rs. 50 level 
Gains and
loss (Game 3)
Gains only
(Game 1+5)
Page | 19  
 
Relationship with Household Variables  
The household variables observed are net assets, net income, occupation, and gender. The 
distribution of risk aversion by gender is significant, and is discussed below. Due to the number 
of categories as well as sample size, a regression or a chi-square was not implemented to 
determine the significance of net asset, net income and occupation.  
To examine the relationship with net assets and net income and occupation, graphical 
representations of the distribution of a household variable for a particular risk class are shown 
for each of these three variables. An analysis of the key trends from these graphs is thus 
presented in this section.  
Net Assets 
 
Chart 3, the distribution of extreme and risk seeking classes displays an interesting trend. 
More than 70% of those who displayed extreme and risk seeking behavior were those with the 
highest category of net wealth- i.e., with a net wealth of RS. 1.6 million or greater. Under the 
extreme risk classification, the only other wealth group that was represented was that with a net 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Extreme
Severe
Intermediate
Moderate
Slight to Risk Neutral
Neutral to Risk Seeking
Chart 3: Risk Aversion and Net Wealth (in Rs. hundred thousand)
0 -2
2 to 4
4 to 6
6 to 8
8 to 10
10 to 12
16+
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wealth below Rs. 200,000. This suggests the behavior of individuals with the most and least 
assets in the sample display risk seeking as well as extreme risk averse choices – unlike any 
other income class in the sample.     
Net Income 
 
Chart 4 illustrates the composition of each risk aversion class by net income level. 75% 
of the respondents in the extreme risk class, and 57.14% in the risk seeking class were those with 
a negative net income. Like the previous graph, this once again suggests that the lowest income 
household tends to display two extremes of risk appetite– both risk friendly, and extreme risk 
aversion.   
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Extreme
Severe
Intermediate
Moderate
Slight to Risk Neutral
Neutral to Risk Seeking
Chart 4: Risk Aversion and Net Income (in RS. thousand)
Below 0 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 175-200 200+
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Occupation  
Occupation was categorized into own business owners, salaried workers, agriculture is 
further subdivided into landless laborers, agriculture workers who owned less than 1 acre of land, 
agricultural workers who owned 1-5 acres of land, and agricultural workers who owned greater 
than 5 acres of land. 
 
Chart 5 summarizes the composition of each risk class by agriculture. The landless 
laborer, the occupation that usually has a negative net income and the lowest value of net assets, 
displays a similar “behavior of the extremes” seen in net assets and net income -  42.8% of the 
risk seeking class, and 50% of the extreme risk aversion class is comprised of landless laborers.  
Salaried workers are the only other occupation that is represented in both extreme risk aversion 
class as well as risk seeking class. Own business, or individuals that own and run a business, is 
the only occupation that does not display either extreme risk aversion or risk seeking behavior.  
  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Extreme
Severe
Intermediate
Moderate
Slight to Risk Neutral
Neutral to Risk Seeking
Chart 5: Risk Aversion and Occupation  
Landless Agri<1 Agri 1-5 Agri 5< Salaried Own Business
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Gender 
A chi square test that tested that the difference in the distribution of risk aversion for 
males and females was statistically significant.
 
A larger proportion of women are have a severe risk aversion or higher (73.56% for 
women, 60.71% for men). Only 9.2% of the women in the sample displayed moderate risk 
aversion, as compared to 29.17% of the men in the sample.  However, a larger proportion of 
women show slight to neutral (10.34% and 5.36% for men) and neutral to risk seeking behavior 
(6.9% for women, 4.76% for men).  This suggests that the relationship between risk aversion and 
gender may not be linear as suggested by previous studies. 
 
  
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
MALE
FEMALE
Chart 6: Risk Aversion and Gender
Extreme Severe Intermediate Moderate Slight to neutral Negative to neutral
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Conclusion  
Overall, this study observes mostly intermediate risk aversion across all 6 games, 
followed by both severe and moderate risk aversion. It notes a nonlinear relationship between 
risk aversion and household characteristics.  
The landless laborer, an individual in our sample that has a sample had a negative net 
income and low net assets, comprises the majority of respondents in the extreme risk aversion 
and risk seeking classes. This contradictory behavior indicates that the relationship between 
wealth and risk aversion may not be linear. Furthermore, since the landless laborer forms a 
majority of India’s poor, and this paradoxical relationship is perhaps one way to differentiate this 
occupation from other occupations.  
According to Biswanger (1980), there was no statistically significant difference between risk 
class observed in hypothetical and real payoffs are made. This study was primed with a survey 
on financial assets and liabilities, and thus the answers were made with an emphasis on accuracy. 
Although real payoffs can show how a farmer makes a decision when faced with real money, it 
may not accurately reflect a rural household’s financial decision, but rather mimic gambling.   
An improvement moving forward would be to increase the sample size for the experiment. 
The sample size (N=45) limited the interpretation of the chi-square (as cell counts were often 
less than 5). 
 Finally, since this study was motivated to understand the role of risk aversion in personal 
finance decisions, more research should be done in the utility of understanding risk aversion for a 
rural household in this context.  One way would be to further investigate barriers a household 
faces in adapting to micro-insurance and micro-investment products, such as financial literacy as 
noted in Cole et al. (2009)  may play a role in impacting risk aversion.  
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Appendix: I) Household Survey 
(1) Household composition: 
1. Household Size  
2. Household Type 
(Kaccha-1/Pukka-2/Semi-pukka-3) 
 
3. Weather any household member has and Kisan credit card. 
(Yes-1, No-2) 
 
4. If yes in question 4, then the amount received during the last 
365 days. 
 
 
(2) Particulars of the households: 
 
S.no 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Name(From previous 
table) 
 
        
Educational 
qualification 
 
        
Approximate Level 
of education 
        
Does he/she receive 
money 
 
        
Salaried/Daily wages 
 
        
How much 
(`) 
 
       
Primary occupation  
       
S.no. Name of member Relation to head Sex 
 (M-1, 
F-2) 
Age 
(years) 
Marital 
status 
1. 
     
2. 
     
3. 
     
4. 
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Any seasonality, 
Please specify 
 
 
       
If working in farm, 
average hours spent 
on field in a week 
 
       
Seasonality(number 
of months he/she 
works on the farm) 
 
       
Life insurance(Y/N) 
If yes coverage 
amount(`) 
        
If yes, premium 
amount(`) 
        
Accident 
insurance(Y/N) 
If yes coverage 
amount(`) 
 
        
If yes premium 
amount(`) 
        
Is he/she away from 
family(Y/N) 
 
        
Does he/she send 
money(Y/N) 
 
        
How much 
(`) 
        
 
Expenses:  
Household Expenses 
(`) 
Frequency 
(daily/monthly/yearly) 
Amount per frequency 
(`) 
Ration Monthly 
 
Festivals 
(i) Diwali Yearly 
 
(ii) Eid Yearly 
 
(iii) Pongal Yearly 
 
(iv) Other festivals Yearly 
 
Home maintenance Yearly 
 
Electricity bill Monthly 
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Telephone/mobile bills Monthly 
 
Cattle/livestock food Monthly 
 
Health expenses Monthly 
 
School fees Monthly 
 
Miscellaneous Monthly 
 
 
Other expenses incurred by the household: (Over the last one year) 
Item description Quantity/number of times Value 
(`) 
A. Residential plot and building 
Purchase of plot 
 
  
Lease amount, if land taken on 
rent 
  
Improvement of plots 
 
  
Purchases of house , building or 
any other residential construction 
 
  
Any major repair of building or 
other construction owned 
 
  
B. Farm Business 
Purchase of land 
 
  
Lease amount, if land on rent 
 
  
Purchase of farm houses, barns & 
animal sheds 
 
  
Purchase of agricultural 
machinery and implements 
  
Fertilizers/Seeds 
 
  
Purchase of any transport 
equipment 
 
  
Livestock purchase 
 
  
Any major repairs of agricultural 
equipment 
 
  
Any major repairs of transport 
equipment 
 
  
Storage cost for the finished crop 
  
Page | 29  
 
Any other expenditure on farm 
business, if yes specify, 
 
 
  
 
Item description Amount/quantity/number of 
times 
Value 
(`) 
Non-farm business 
Purchase of land 
 
  
Lease amount, if land taken on rent 
 
  
Improvement/maintenance of land 
 
  
Purchase of shop/work place 
 
  
Construction of workshop/shop 
 
  
Material kept in stock(inventory) 
 
  
Maintenance charges (electricity 
bill, telephone bill, salary of 
workers) 
  
Any other expenditure on non-
farm business, please specify 
 
  
 
Income/Revenue generated from farm business: (Over the last one year) 
Item description Quantity Value 
(`) 
Sale of plot/land 
 
  
Sale of farm house barn shed, any 
other building  
  
Crop harvested (In bags) 
 
  
Revenue generated from selling 
the produce 
 
 
  
 
Income/Revenue generated from nonfarm business: (Over the last one year) 
Item description Quantity Value 
(`) 
Sale of plot/land/workplace/shop 
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Lease amount, if land has been 
given on lease 
  
Revenue generated from sales 
 
 
  
Revenue generated from any other 
activities, specify 
  
 
Assets: 
(3) Land owned by household: 
 
S.no. Type of land owned2 Area owned 
(Acres) 
Value as on date of 
survey 
     (`) 
 
 
  
    
    
 
Have you given your land on lease(Y/N) 
Area 
   
Amount 
   
Harvest share 
   
                                                 
2
 Type of land owned:  
Seasonal crop area irrigated - 1,  
Seasonal crop area unirrigated – 2, 
Orchards and plantations(including forest) – 3, 
Area put to non- agricultural uses :  water bodies – 4, 
Exclusively for non-farm business – 5, 
Other non-agricultural uses –6 ; 
Residential area including housesite-7 
Other areas – 9. 
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(4) Buildings and other constructions owned by household: 
S.no Item Owned as on date of survey 
Area owned Value 
(`) 
1. Residential  building 
 
 
  
2. Barn 
 
 
  
3. Animal shed 
 
 
  
4. Farm house 
 
 
  
5. Others 
 
 
 
 
6. Workshop/workplace 
 
 
  
7. Shop 
 
 
  
8. Incomplete structures 
(work-in-progress) 
 
  
9. Total(1-8) 
 
 
  
 
 
Have you rented any part of your house(Y/N)  
If yes, 
 
Monthly rent (`) 
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Advance received (`) 
 
(5) Livestock and poultry owned by household: 
 
S.no. 
 
Item 
 
Owned as on date of survey 
No. Age Value(`) 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cattle 
(a) Female: 
i. Breeding cow: in milk 
   
2. ii. Breeding cow: dry 
   
3. iii. Not calved even once 
   
4. iv. Calve 
   
5. (b) Male: 
i. For work/breeding 
   
6. ii. Calve 
   
7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Buffalo 
(c) Female: 
v. Breeding cow: in milk 
   
8. vi. Breeding cow: dry 
   
9. vii. Not calved even once 
   
10. viii. Others 
   
11. (d) Male: 
iii. For work/breeding 
   
12. iv. Others 
   
13. Other 
large heads 
Horse, mule & pony 
   
14. Donkey 
   
15. Ovines, 
pigs, 
rabbits. 
Sheep 
   
16. Goat 
   
17. Pig 
   
18. Rabbit 
   
19. Poultry 
birds. 
Cock 
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20. Hen 
   
21. Chiken 
   
22. Other poultry birds 
   
23. Others 
   
24. Total(1-23) 
   
 
 (6) Agricultural machinery owned by household: 
S.no. Item Owned as on the date of survey 
Number Value 
(`) 
1. Sickle, axe, spade & chopper 
 
  
2. Plough (wooden / iron) 
 
  
3. Seed-drill, sprayer  
 
  
4. Tractor (excluding trolly) 
 
  
5. Thresher 
 
  
6. Canecrusher- power operated 
 
  
7. Canecrusher- others 
 
  
8. Oil crusher-power operated 
 
  
9. Oil crusher- others 
 
  
10. Pump-electric 
 
  
11. Pump- others 
 
  
Page | 34  
 
12. Other water lifting equipment (viz. 
persian wheel, dhenki, etc.) 
  
13. Furniture and fixtures 
 
  
14. Others 
 
  
    (7) Transport equipment owned by household: 
S.no Item Owned as on the date of survey 
Number How old Value 
(`) 
1. Carts (hand-driven / animal driven) 
 
   
2. Bicycles 
 
   
3. Rickshaws 
 
   
4. Motor cycles/ scooters/ mopeds/ 
autorickshaws 
 
   
5. Motor cars/jeep/van 
 
   
6. Trucks/light comm. vehicles (LCV)/passenger 
buses 
 
   
7. Tractor-trollies/ trailers/jugads 
 
   
8. Boats 
 
   
9. Other transport equipment 
 
   
10. Total(1-9) 
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        (8) Durable assets owned by household: 
S.no Item Owned as on the date of survey 
Number How old Value 
(`) 
1. Bedstead 
   
2. Steel / wooden almirah / dressing table 
   
3. Other furniture & fixtures 
   
4. Radio, record player/tape recorder/stereo 
   
5. Television 
   
6. Other goods for recreation , entertainment 
(eg. VCR/VCP/VCD, DVD Player, PC) 
   
7. Gas/electric oven/cooking range/ 
microwave oven 
   
8. Electric fan, clock/ watch, water filter / 
electric iron/ sewing machine 
   
9. Refrigerator/ air cooler/ air conditioner/ 
washing machine 
   
10. Other cooking and household appliances 
   
11. Bullions & ornaments 
   
12. Other durables 
   
13. Total(1-14) 
   
 
  (9) Financial assets owned by households in cooperative societies and companies: 
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S.no. 
 
Type of institution 
 
Value as on the date of 
survey 
(`) 
 
Rate of interest 
(%) 
1. Cooperative credit society/bank 
 
  
2. Government certificates viz. NSC , Indira vikas 
patra, kisan vikas patra, RBI Bonds etc. 
  
3. Deposit in post office including national saving 
scheme deposits 
  
4. Commercial bank 
 
  
5. Deposit with individuals 
 
  
6. Cash in hand 
 
  
7. Unsecure loan 
  
8. Professional dues, trade credit 
  
9. Kind loans 
  
10. Others 
 
  
11. Total(1-7) 
  
   
Liabilities: 
Kind of loans and liabilities payable by the household: 
S.no. Nature of 
liabilities 
(cash-1, 
kind-2) 
Period Source3 Purpose4 Rate of interest 
charged 
Amount 
outstanding as on 
the date of survey 
(`) 
                                                 
3
 source : 
trader –1, relatives & friends -2, doctor, lawyers and other professionals–3,financial institution-4, others -9 
4
 purpose : 
current expenditure in farm business - 1, current expenditure in non farm business -2, other household expenditure -
3, other 
expenditure -9 
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Detail of use the loan has been put to: 
Sno.  
(from 
above) 
Where has the loan been invested Return on investment 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Any amount pending to the suppliers: 
Any amount payable to the supplier(Y/N) 
If yes how much 
 
 
When is the amount pending 
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Appendix: II) Game Results  
Game 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PNY_01 A A B C E A 
PNY_02 D D C C F C 
PNY_03 F O F O F O 
PNY_04 A A A A A F 
PNY_05 C D D A E E 
PNY_06 A B C B A B 
PNY_07 C A E F D B 
PNY_08 A A C C A A 
PNY_09 C C D D B C 
PNY_10 B C E C C D 
PNY_11 A A B D C C 
PNY_12 B B C B B B 
PNY_13 A A B A A A 
PNY_14 B A B B B B 
PNY_15 A B D C B B 
PNY_16 B A B D C A 
PNY_17 B C B B C C 
PNY_18 E E A A F C 
PNY_19 B B B B C B 
PNY_20 O A C B O O 
PNY_21 C B B F B C 
PNY_22 B C C B C D 
WIFE _3 B A B B A B 
WIFE _4 A B B D A B 
WIFE_5 E E A A A A 
WIFE_6 E C A F B E 
MOTHER_7 A C C B A D 
WIFE_11 A A F C C B 
WIFE_14 A B E E E B 
WIFE_15 A B A A A B 
MOTHER_18 C C F F C B 
WIFE_19 B B C A D B 
MOTHER_21 C B A D B A 
MOTHER_22 C B B C C C 
PWN_1 A A B B B B 
PWN_2 B B C D E E 
PWN_3 B D A D B A 
PWN_4 O O C B A A 
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PWN_5 B B C B B B 
PWN_6 A A A A A A 
PWN WIFE_1 B B B A A A 
PWN WIFE_3 B E A B D A 
PWN WIFE_4 B D E B B A 
PWN WIFE_5 B B B B C C 
PWN WIFE_6 F F A B D O 
 
